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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
9712

COY RINGO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant has appealed from a conviction for
assault upon a fellow convict with malice aforethought in
violation of Section 76-7-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried and convicted for committing
an assault upon a fellow prisoner, while confined in the
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Utah State Prison, upon jury trial in the Third Judicial
District Court and sentenced to life imprisonment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The state contends the appellant's conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state submits the following statement of facts in
supplement to those set out in the appellant's brief as being directly applicable to the sole issue raised on appeal.
The sole issue raised on appeal is that the oral admissions
or confession obtained from the appellant, and introduced
at trial, were obtained in violation of the appellant's State
constitutional right against being compelled to give evidence against himself. Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution.
The record discloses the following pertinent testimony
on the issue raised. Shortly after the assault by the appellant on Howard LeRoy Ollerdisse, the appellant was
interrogated by Ferris D. Andrus, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, in the presence of Deputy Warden Fitzgerald,
Ernest Wright, Executive Secretary of the Board of Corrections, and Lieutenant Jooston of the prison staff. The
interrogation took place in the office of the deputy warden
on January 2, 1962, at about 1 :30 p. m. (R. 230). No force,
threats or promises were made during the interrogation.
Mr. Wright took notes of the interrogation, which lasted
from 45 minutes to an hour (R. 235). The questions during the interrogation were asked by Deputy Andrus (R.
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241-242). At the outset of the interrogation, the appellant
entered the room and stated :
"Well, what are you going to ask me" (R. 242).
Thereafter, Deputy Andrus indicated that he was just interested in finding out what happened. The appellant then
explained the motive for and admitted stabbing Ollerdisse
with a laundry pin. No coercion of any kind appears in
the record, and it further appears that the appellant's statement was spontaneous and voluntary. However, the appellant was in custody at the time the statement was given
and was not warned of any right to remain quiet or to have
counsel. It is the latter facts that appellant contends
amount to constitutional violations.
At the time of trial, when the above evidence was
offered, counsel for appellant requested an out-of-court
hearing as to the voluntariness of the statement (R. 230).
After laying initial foundation, the district attorney offered to complete the matter out of court (R. 231). The
defense counsel then stated, "I withdraw the objection
at this time." Thereafter, the statement of the appellant,
as reported by Deputy Andrus, was admitted before the
jury, and defense counsel cross-examined Andrus thereon.
Thereafter, Ernest D. Wright was called and testified similarly, without any objection to the testimony from defense
counsel, and defense counsel cross-examined Mr. Wright
on his direct testimony (R. 239-245). Subsequently, the
appellant's opening statement was made and his witnesses
and evidence presented. After the defense rested, the
defense counsel made a motion to strike the testimony of
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Officer Andrus and Mr. Wright on the grounds that it was
not voluntary (R. 292). The motion was denied (R. 293).
No instructions on the question of voluntariness were requested nor exceptions taken to the failure of the court to
submit the matter to the jury (R. 298, 312-330). No issue
is raised on appeal concerning the court's actions in this
regard.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM AS
TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS STATEMENT OR ADMISSIONS AT THE TIME OF
TRIAL.

It is submitted that the appellant waived any claim
he may now have as to the voluntariness of his statement
by conduct at trial. Generally, the court should allow a
defendant an out-of-court hearing on the voluntariness of
any confessions. State v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 229 P. 2d
289 (1951); State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 142 P. 2d 178
(1943). Such a procedure, to establish preliminary voluntariness, is not necessary if the statement merely amounts
to an admission. Thus, in State v. Masato Karumai, 101
U. 592, 126 P. 2d 1047 ( 1942), the court stated:
"Although there are some cases to the contrary, the great weight of authority and the betterreasoned cases hold that before receiving an admission-as distinguished from a confession-in evidence, it is not necessary that a preliminary show-
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ing be made to the effect that the statement was
voluntary."
The statements given in the Masato Karumai case are
similar to those of the instant case where the court was of
the opinion that they were merely admissions. The court
said:
"In the statement testified to there was no express adn1ission of the guilt of any crime of which
defendant was charged. Construed against defendant in its strongest possible light, it was, at most,
merely an admission that the defendant killed the
deceased because deceased was no good. On the
other hand, it might well be taken to mean that
the defendant merely asserted that the deceased
was no good, without ad1nitting the killing or offering a reason therefor. Even if taken as an admission that the defendant killed the deceased because
deceased was no good, this does not admit that the
killing was done with a criminal intent" ( 105 Utah
at 602).
However, even so, it is well established that before
error may be claimed, a contest must have been raised.
State v. Mares, 113 U. 255, 192 P. 2d 861 (1948). In the
instant case, defense counsel expressly withdrew his objection to the testimony of Deputy Andrus. As to Mr.
Wright, no objection to his testimony reciting the accused's
statements was voiced. Not until after full cross-examination of the state's witnesses, and presentation of the defense, was any objection voiced. This was in the nature
of a motion to strike after the full testimony had, with appellant's express consent, been placed before the jury. No
effort was made to have the appellant testify out of the
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hearing of the jury as to the voluntariness of the statements, nor were instructions requested by the appellant on
the issue. The general rule is stated in Abbott, Criminal
Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 348:
"It is a general rule that, in order to take advantage of the admission of evidence by the trial
court as error and to secure a reversal of its judgment upon appeal, the evidence must be objected
to in the trial court."

Sec. 351, ibid.:
"Any objection to the admissibility of evidence
is waived by failure to object thereto. If defendant
fails to object to evidence when first offered, he
waives its incompetency."
Sec. 352, ibid. :
··A party who has allowed obviously incompetent evidence to be received without objection is not
entitled to have it stricken out, but at most to have
the jury instructed to disregard it."
It is submitted, therefore, that the appellant's express
withdrawal of his objection to Deputy Andrus's testimony,
his failure to object to the testimony of Mr. Wright, his
belated motion to strike and his failure to request an instruction to the jury waived any claim of error.

Further, since the appellant offered no evidence, nor
sought to place the matter before the jury, no complaint
could be had. In State v. Dunkley, 85 U. 546, 39 P. 2d 1097
( 1935) , a claim of improper admission of a confession was
based on the failure to allow the appellant to see counsel.
No issue, however, was joined at trial. The court stated:
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"* * * The matter, for what it is worth,
ought to have been put before the jury. But since
the defendant did not offer to do so, nor offer any
evidence before the jury bearing on the question
of voluntariness, we think the defendant is not in
position to complain."
It is submitted, therefore, no claim of error is prop-

erly before the court.
POINT II
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The appellant contends that the circumstances of his
questioning by prison officials and members of the sheriff's office, and the resulting admissions made by him
occurred in violation of his state constitutional rights
against self incrimination. The appellant's contention is
based upon the facts that the appellant was in custody at
the time of the interrogation, and at that time was not
advised of his rights to counsel, nor advised that he need
not say anything incriminatory. On the other hand, there
is no showing in the record that the appellant ever asked
for counsel and was refused, or that he was unaware of
his rights. Additionally, it appears that no coercion, force,
threats, or promises were made to the· appellant to induce
the admissions, nor was the appellant a person of immature
age or experience. Finally, appellant was only interrogated
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a comparatively short time and appeared to respond to
questions with complete spontaneity.
There is no mandatory constitutional requirement that
a suspect be afforded counsel at an interrogation, nor that
he be advised of a right to counsel or warned of making
any incriminating statement. The absence of a warning
as to these matters may, however, be a factor in determining whether or not a confession or admission so obtained
was in fact voluntary. State v. Masato Karumai, supra.
The essential question is: Was the confession voluntary?
It is the evidentiary consequences of appellant's confession
or admissions with which the court is in fact concerned. If
the confession is voluntary, the absence of counsel or warning and the fact of custody are all immaterial. If the confession was involuntary, the evidence should have been excluded, and the admission of the confession would be reversible error. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959), Chap.
3, and especially Section 3.07. Therefore, before reversal
is in order, it must appear that the confession or admissions of the appellant were involuntary as a matter of law
because of the deficiencies complained of on appeal. Further, appellant must bear the burden in this respect.
The facts relied on by the appellant and those apparent from all the circumstances must be considered in determining whether the appellant's statement was voluntary.
Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 185 (1953). The appellant contends that the facts of the instant case give rise to
a mandatory conclusion that appellant's confession or admissions were involuntary, and relies upon a federal dis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trict court case in support of that contention, United
States v. Kallas, 272 Fed. 742 (D. C. Wash. 1921). It is
the position of the state that the Kallas case does not stand
for the position urged by the appellant, is not the general
federal rule, is somewhat contrary to the applicable federal
cases, and is inconsistent, to the extent it may be claimed
as applicable in this case, with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.
The Kallas case must be viewed in light of the circumstances surrounding the decision. The case involved an
application for a writ of habeas corpus to which the
United States Attorney merely filed demurrer. The court
had nothing before it but the bear facts of the petition and
a record of hearing before a United States Commissioner.
The petition claimed that the evidence before the United
States Commissioner, upon whose order he was being detained for the grand jury, was insufficient to warrant
detention. The petition alleged that the only evidence of
wrongdoing was contained in certain statements he made
to a government investigator while confined for investigation. There was no evidence before the commissioner of
the crime except the claimed confession, which in the absence of a corpus would not suffice in any event to detain
the accused. The court then by dicta indicated that a warning while in custody should be given, saying it was the
"safer course." What the court was in effect saying was
that such circumstances may be of a compelling nature, but
the court merely overruled the demurrer, thus requiring
proof of voluntariness. That the case is not authority to
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support a conclusion that detention and absence of a warning of an accused's constitutional rights requires a finding
of voluntariness can be found from other federal cases
commenting on the Kallas case. 1 Thus, in United States
V. Lydecker, 275 F. 2d 976 (D. C. N. Y. 1921), the petitioner made a claim contending the indictment against him
should have been quashed for failure to warn him of his
rights and because the confession was taken while the
petitioner was in custody. Petitioner relied on the Kallas
case. The court stated:
"The case of U. S. v. Kallas (D. C.) 272 F. 742,
does not support defendant's broad contention."
The court further noted :

"* * * it is ruled that the fact that an accused was in custody does not render his confession
involuntary, nor is it necessary that he should have
been warned that what he said would be used
against him. It is sufficient if the confession was
voluntarily made, though he was not warned or advised that he had the right to remain silent. Not to
have had the aid of counsel, or that the confession
was made to an officer while in custody, or drawn
out by cross-questioning put to the accused and that
Pinkerton detectives and other police officers were
called in to assist in the questioning or to be present, or that he was confined in the police station
and on the next day requestioned, are all matters
bearing upon his asserted involuntary statement."
Thus, the court recognized that question of custody
and warning went only to the weight of the evidence in
lAdditionally, a reading of the Kallas case shows the judge to he confusing
the question of procedural correctness which relates also to self incrimination
with that of due p~ocess based on compeHed evidence.
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determining voluntariness and did not per se render the
confession involuntary. It is submitted, therefore, the
Kallas case is no precedent for the contention broached by
appellant.
Additionally, the Kallas case would be contrary to the
holdings of other subsequent federal cases and with decisions of the United States Supreme Court if the interpretation urged by appellant were adopted.
In Wilson v. United States, 163 U. S. 613 (1896) the
United States Supreme Court noted:
"In short, the true test of admissibility is that
the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort."
The defendant in the Wilson case was in custody, before a magistrate who questioned him without warning him
of his rights, nor allowing him counsel. The court noted :
"And it is laid down that it is not essential to
the admissibility of a confession that it should appear that the person was warned that what he said
would be used against him, but on the contrary, if
the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient though
it appear that he was not so warned."
The court then went to the facts of the case and noted:
"It is true that, while he was not sworn, he
made the statement before a commissioner who was
investigating a charge against him, as he was informed; he was in custody but not in irons; there
had been threats of mobbing him the night before
the examination; he did not have the aid of counsel,
and he was not warned that the statement m~ght
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be used against him or advised that he need not
answer. There were matters which went to the
weight or credibility of what he said of an incriminating character * * * They were not of
themselves sufficient. to require his answers to be
excluded on the ground of being involuntary as a
matter of law."

It is noteworthy that the judge who presided in Kallas
did not refer to the Wilson opinion; apparently he was unaware of it.
In Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303 (1912), the
defendant was arrested on the charge of murder. He was
taken before a United States Commissioner. The defendant, in custody, was also without counsel, and was not
warned of his rights. The record otherwise showed the
defendant "voluntarily" testified to the crime before the
commissioner. The court held the evidence admissible,
holding:
"We are of the opinion that it was not essential
to the admissibility of his testimony that he should
first have been warned that what he said might be
used against him."
The court cited the Wilson case as valid precedent for its
conclusion. 2
Additionally, the lower federal courts have also fol~owed policies that are not compatible with the broad concept espoused by appellant. In Gerard v. United States,
61 F. 2d 872 (7th Cir. 1932), the accused made a statement
2The Wilson case, as well as the Powers case, was cited with approval in
United States V. Carignan, 342 U. S. 3 6, 41 (1951), which allowed ad·
mission of a confession while in custody and without counsel.
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while in custody and without having been advised of his
rights. Also, he obviously was without counsel. The court
said, in rejecting a contention of error:
"Appellant further contends that there was
error in refusing to strike and exclude the testimony
of the arresting officers relative to appellant's denial of the facts that he was acquainted with Cohen
and Spivak, that he purchased the plates, and that
he was ever in Spivak's car. He bases this contention upon the fact that the officers failed to advise
him, while he was under arrest and in their custody,
that any statement he might make to them might
be used against him, and that he was under no
obligation to make any statement. There was no
duress proven, and this contention is without merit.
Powers v. United States, 223 .U. S. 303, 32 S. Ct.
281, 56 L. Ed. 448; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.
S. 613, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090."
In Wood v. United States, 128 F. 2d 265 (D. C. Cir.
1942) , the court said :

"* * * The only bar arises when compulsion destroys the confession's probative value. Confessions, it is said, do not become involuntary because elicited by questions, or made while the confesser is under arrest, or in the absence of counsel,
without warning or caution that the statement may
be used against him, nor by the concurrence of all
these conditions in a single case. Admittedly these
principles apply when the statement is not made in
the course of judicial proceedings."
See also Himmelfarb v. U. S., 175 F. 2d 924 (C. A. 9th,
1949); Anderson v. United States, 124 F. 2d 58 (6th Cir.
1941).
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Many federal district court cases have reached similar
results. U. S. v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842 (D. C. Tex.
1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 854; U. S. v. Wheeler, 172 F.
Supp. 278 (D. C. Pa. 1959) 3 ; United States v. Simpson, 162
F. Supp. 677 (D. C. DC 1958). The latter case is especially
relevant to the instant claim. In the Simpson case, the defendants were members of the Air Force. They were
brought by an air policeman to the Provost Marshal, where
they were interrogated by the F. B. I. in the presence of
military officials. Counsel was not present nor were the
accused advised or warned of their rights. A factor, not
present here, also complicated the issue in the Simpson
case in that Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U. S. C. 831, makes mandatory the advising of a military accused of his rights before any evidence may be used
against him in a court martial. Under these circumstances,
the court held the confession properly admitted, finding
that they were not thereby rendered involuntary where
other evidence disclosed no duress and that "no physical
force was employed and * * * no mental coercion and
no promises."
It must be concluded that the federal cases, including
that of Kallas, do not favor appellant's contention. Nor do
the authorities from other jurisdictions. State v. Evans,
345 Mo. 398, 133 S. W. 2d 389 (1939); People v. Pongetti,
72 C. A. 2d 749, 165 P. 2d 479; People v. Tipton, 48 Cal.
2d 389, 309 P. 2d 813; State v. Preis, 89 Ariz. 336, 362 P.
aAffirmed 275 F. 2d 94.
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2d 660 4 • Therefore, appellant must find support from decisions in this state if he is to succeed.
An analysis of the decisions from Utah demonstrates
that appellant's contention is without merit. In State v.
Masato Karumai, 101 U. 592, 126 P. 2d 1047 (1942), a
series of admissions were obtained from the appellant while
interrogated by a police officer, while in custody, without
aid of counsel, without warning the accused of his rights,
and where the accused was of Japanese descent and claimed
difficulty in understanding English. Further, evidence
clearly existed that showed the appellant, at least subsequent to the alleged crime, suffered from some mental
illness. The court rejected a contention that this rendered
the confe~sion involuntary, saying:
"But even assuming this statement were a confession and not merely an admission-as above
concluded-still there was no showing that it was
involuntarily made. The fact that the statement
was made to an officer while under arrest does not
make it involuntary. [Citing cases.] Nor is the
fact that no warning was given defendant that what
he said might be used against him conclusive, but
all these facts and the circumstances existing at
the time should be considered in determining the
voluntary or involuntary character of the statement.
[Citing cases.] The court, therefore, did not err in
receiving this testimony in evidence."
The Masato Karumai case is much more compelling in its
plea for relief than the facts of the instant case, but since
'Intensive analysis of cases from other states has not !been presented in this
brief since the state contends Utah precedent is ample on this matter. But
see A1bbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 568.
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it clearly appeared that the accused's statement was without coercion or duress, the court found no error.
There was in this case no refusal of counsel or long interrogation as was the case in State v. Braasch, 119 U. 450,
229 P. 2d 289 (1951), wherein the court again upheld the
propriety of the confession. The same standard was accepted in State v. Bridge, 3 U. 2d 281, 282 P. 2d 1043
(1955) and State v. Ashdown, 5 U. 2d 59, 296 P. 726
(1956), aff'd. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U. S. 426.
In State v. Nelson, 12 U. 2d 177, 364 P. 2d 409 (1961),
the following contention was raised:
"The defendant seeks reversal of his conviction
on the ground that he was deprived of rights assured him under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U. S. Constitution, and Sections 7 and 12 of Article
I of the Utah Constitution, because he was taken
into custody and kept in the presence of police officers and a magistrate and questioned concerning
his conduct during the first two hours following the
accident without being advised of his right to the
aid of counsel, or that his statem~nts might be used
against him."
Again the facts of that case are more severe than those
presented in the instant case; however, the court affirmed
the use of the admissions against the accused, noting:

"* * * There is no suggestion nor intimation in the record that he ·was unwilling or even
hesitant to talk to the Officer or to the Justice of
the Peace, but he seems to have been voluble enough
in conversing with them."
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Under these circumstances, it can only be concluded
that the appellant's complaint is not well taken. The facts
disclosed here show no reluctance on the part of the appellant to speak about his crime. When he first entered the
office of the warden, he appeared to invite questions by
asking (R. 242) :
"Well, what are you going to ask me?"
Nor could he even have been advised of his rights, for the
record shows (R. 235):
"Q. And did you at any time inform Mr.
Ringo he had the right to be represented by counsel?

"A.

No, sir, I didn't have a chance to.

"Q.

But you didn't?

"A. I just asked him what happened and he
started talking."
Further, no duress or coercion was used, and, finally,
trial counsel failed to even join issue on the theory now
claimed for reversal.
This court has consistently said that it would not disturb a jury's determination of the voluntariness of a confession in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse. State
v. Crank, supra; State v. Mares, 113 U. 225, 192 P. 2d 861
(1948). Here the facts in no manner demonstrate such
conduct that could be deemed violative of Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution. There is nothing in that article requiring an accused be advised of his rights, or compelled to have counsel present, or be interrogated other
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than when he is in custody; quite to the contrary, it is compulsion that is prohibited, and hence the question is one of
voluntariness vs. involuntariness. A mechanical recitation
of rights prior to interrogation would offer little comfort
if a confession is otherwise involuntary and, on the other
hand, the failure to advise or provide counsel is immaterial
if a confession is otherwise voluntary. See Ritz, TwentyFive Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U. S.
Supreme Court, 19 Washington & Lee Law Review 35, 39
(1962). This court should refrain from a mechanical or
formal attitude and approach the question purely from the
view of: Was the confession voluntary? Such a rule allows for flexibility and protects both the public and the
individual. When applied in the instant case, it appears
appellant's contention of a violation of constitutional rights
is unmeritorious.

CONCLUSION
The appellant has failed to show that he preserved
his claim for appellate consideration and, further, that his
claim has a proper constitutional foundation. This court
should consequently affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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